A Mutiny to Die for
Mutiny is the most serious of maritime crimes; an organized rebellion against a crew’s ‘leader’, punishable by death. Just the word itself sounds bad. But, in one notable case, it was truly a matter of ‘give me liberty or give me death’.
This is not the well-known Mutiny on the Bounty. It is the more important and historic events of Mutiny on the Amistad. A slave runner that hijacked persons from Africa and classified the ‘captives’ as cargo. A story intriguing enough to be made into a movie starring Anthony Hopkins and Matthew McConnaughy. With the 250th Anniversary of the United States’ independence approaching, it is a proper time to reflect on how a historical, yet horrific maritime event and Supreme Court case helped inform freedoms in the United States today.
One-Way Out-Mutiny
In 1839, Portuguese slave hunters waded ashore to hunt and capture natives of Mendeland, Africa in present-day Sierra Leone. Hundreds were transported by sea to Cuba and sold into slavery. In Cuba, two Spanish plantation owners, Don Ruiz and Don Montez, purchased 53 of the captives and transported them on board a 120 foot Spanish flagged wooden schooner named La Amistad to plantations near Porto Principe in Cuba. Amistad means ‘Friendship’ in Spanish, yet this was anything but that.
On July 1, 1839, the 53 captives broke free of their chains and shackles. They killed the captain and crew, took control of the helm and ordered Ruiz and Montez to sail east towards Africa. But, Ruiz and Montez had other plans; secretly changing course toward the East Coast of the United States. On Aug. 24th, a U.S. Navy brig WASHINGTON encountered La Amistad off Montauk, Long Island and seized it, arresting the enslaved. The vessel was taken in tow to New London, CT. Now the crew of the WASHINGTON had their own visions of monetary reward for maritime claims for salvaging the vessel, its cargo and the captives.
Under maritime law, a person who saves a ship or cargo from peril is entitled to compensation. The captain of the brig WASHINGTON claimed he and his crew rescued La Amistad from the captives with great difficulty and danger. The captain claimed that, had he and his crew not seized the vessel, there would have been a total loss to La Amistad’s «rightful» owners. The WASHINGTON’s captain therefore invoked maritime salvage rights.
The captain of the WASHINGTON filed an admiralty salvage complaint in federal court where he described the encounter with the Amistad. He estimated the value of the cargo saved at $40,000 and the captives at $25,000.
Salvage is a doctrine unique to maritime law that pre-dates the Christian era by nine hundred years as Eastern District of New York Judge Edward Korman said in the Staten Island Ferry crash salvage case. In re Complaint of The City of New York, as Owner & Operator of M/V ANDREW J. BARBERI, 534 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Mutiny And No Bounty
The State of Connecticut imprisoned the captives on charges of mutiny (forcible or passive resistance to lawful authority), murder and piracy. Many of them died at sea or while in jail. Mutiny at sea was a capital offense and those convicted faced capital punishment. To the captives, freedom and liberty was worth the risk.
Mutiny is treated as one of the most severe crimes. Under 10 U.S. Code §894—Art. 94, anyone found guilty of mutiny, attempted mutiny, sedition, or failing to report a mutiny can be punished by death or any other lawful punishment.
Connecticut Attorney Roger S. Baldwin (Matthew McCoughney’s character in the movie) represented the captives. He answered the district court complaint, stating: “…each of them are natives of Africa and were born free, and ever since have been and still of right are and ought to be free and not slaves…” The captives described their kidnap, mistreatment, and sale into slavery.
Although the charges were dismissed by the New Haven federal court, the captives remained in custody while the court determined the salvage claims. The District of Connecticut ruled that no one owned the enslaved because they had been illegally captured and transported to the United States against their free will. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the United States Government appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court has played a central role in developing American maritime law. Complex maritime matters like Amistad were heard in federal admiralty forums as dictated by the U.S. Constitution and Federal statutes (28 USC 1333). As the late (and former maritime lawyer) Southern District Judge Charles Haight explained, in all federal courts a Silver Oar would be perched upon the bench in front of the Judge to indicate an admiralty proceeding was underway, a tradition adopted from the British Admiralty courts. See John McCarthy, The Federal Judiciary Turns 225 in Style, The Federal Lawyer (2015).
The Supreme Court’s Admiralty docket goes as far back to 1794 where the Court confirmed that federal courts have jurisdiction over disputes involving captured ships during war. The Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 1 L. Ed. 485 (1794). Throughout the lifespan of the United States, the Supreme Court has made notable rulings such as in 1914 when a foreign shipowner (White Star Line) was sued in New York over a disaster in international waters and was permitted to maintain a proceeding here to seek to limit its liability to the post casualty value of the vessel under United States law (HMS TITANIC). Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718 (1914).
Capital Charges Lead to Supreme Court
The Amistad case was argued in January 1841. Former President John Quincy Adams was asked to represent the captives in the Supreme Court. Adams was the sixth President of the United States, 1825 to 1829. His father John Adams was the second president and a signer of the Declaration of Independence in 1776. John Quincy Adams was the perfect candidate—a leading opponent of slavery and seasoned veteran before the Supreme Court. At first hesitant, Adams (played by Anthony Hopkins in the movie) accepted the challenge, as he described in a letter to attorney Robert S. Baldwin:
My reluctance was founded entirely and exclusively upon the consciousness of my own incompetency to do justice to their cause. In every other point of view there is in my estimation no higher object upon earth of ambition than to occupy that position [to be the attorney for the captives].
See Letter from John Quincy Adams to Roger S. Baldwin dated Nov. 11, 1840.
Adams argued for nine hours passionately defending the captives’ rights to freedom on moral grounds, stating that “I know of no law, statute, or constitution, no code, no treaty applicable to the proceedings of the Executive or the Judiciary, except THAT law” (pointing to a copy of the Declaration of Independence hanging on one of the pillars in the courtroom). See Argument of John Quincy Adams, before the Supreme Court, p. 8, Smithsonian Institution Transcription Center, National Museum of African American History and Culture.
The U.S. Attorney argued treaty obligations required the captives to be returned to Spain. Adams argued American ideals of freedom demanded the captives be freed and returned home to Africa.
The Supreme Court ruled 7-1 on the side of the Africans, freeing them all immediately.
Senior Justice Joseph Story delivered the Court’s decision on March 9, 1841 stating that the captives were “unlawfully kidnapped, and forcibly and wrongfully carried on board a certain vessel” and had never been legal property. The Court concluded:
[T]he said [captives] be declared to be free, and be dismissed from the custody of the court, and go without delay…it was the “ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice.”The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s salvage award to the Captain of the WASHINGTON for cargo and the vessel for having performed “a highly meritorious and useful service to the proprietors of the ship and cargo.” The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 597 (1841).
Once again, the Supreme Court took a deep dive into a maritime case that remains seeworthy to this day. As it turned out, President John Quincy Adams was the right man at the right time to right the wrong and let freedom ring again for the captives of the Amistad. Adams knew firsthand and from his father’s signature, the true meaning of a Declaration of Independence…that “all are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. After 250 years, we still hold these truths to be self-evident!
JAMES MERCANTE is Maritime partner at Gallo Vitucci Klar. He is president of the Board of Commissioners of Pilots of the State of New York and US Navy Captain (Retired). JOANNA M. GRILLO, Maritime associate at Gallo Vitucci Klar, assisted in the preparation of this article.
Written by Briggs Johnson
The Governor of the State of New York just approved major liability and damages changes for automobile accident cases here in New York, which are effective as of May 26, 2026. Governor Hochul initially proposed these changes to help fight against insurance fraud, and to make insurance premiums more affordable. Please keep in mind that, like any other piece of legislation, the changes have elements of vagueness and ambiguous practical implications, which will be litigated. We must all stay tuned for guidance and developments as they take place. With all that being said, the major changes are as follows:
90/180 Category From the “Serious Injury” Threshold Law Is Eliminated
First, New York State has eliminated the “90/180” category from the “serious injury” threshold law, which effectively allowed a plaintiff to recover for an injury or impairment that prevents them from performing their usual and customary activities of daily living for not less than 90 of the first 180 days following the accident. This category was rife with medical professionals stating plaintiff was disabled from work or home or bedridden for at least 90 of the first 180 days after the accident – for injuries that are not permanent – which are the antithesis of why the “serious injury” law was passed in the first place – to reduce frivolous lawsuits.
Modified Comparative Fault Now Applies To All Motor Vehicle Cases
Second, New York is a “pure comparative fault” jurisdiction, meaning that a plaintiff can be 99.9% at fault and still recover damages in New York. Previously, there was no exception for auto cases, and that has now changed as follows: “In any action to recover damages for personal injury subject to [the No-Fault Law], the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant shall bar recovery if the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant is greater than the culpable conduct of the person against whom recovery is sought or is greater than the combined culpable conduct of the persons against whom recovery is sought.” In theory, this would bar recovery for a plaintiff found to be 51% or more at fault in New York, but in practice, the implications are far more difficult to discern. For example, the amendment does not explain how this is supposed to apply in accidents involving several vehicles, where a plaintiff could be assigned a percentage of fault greater than one defendant, but perhaps less than another. In that scenario, our Courts will have to decide who plaintiff can recover from, and whether plaintiff or another defendant makes up the difference.
A New Pain And Suffering Cap On Damages Applies Against Plaintiffs Who Fail To Insure Their Vehicle, Who Drive While Impaired Or While Committing Or Fleeing The Commission Of A Felony, And The Cap Does Not Apply To Wrongful Death Actions
Third, there is a non-economic (past and future pain and suffering) damages cap against plaintiffs in certain situations. The scenarios that put the cap in play are as follows: (1) if plaintiff was driving an uninsured vehicle that the driver was responsible for insuring (unless the lapse in insurance coverage was for fewer than 30 days); (2) if plaintiff was driving while impaired and convicted of that impairment, or operating during the commission of a felony, or immediate flight from one, and convicted of that felony; and (3) it only applies to claims of economic loss, and it does not apply in a wrongful death action.
“Liability” Regarding The Accrual Of Interest Does Not Begin Until Liability And A “Serious Injury” Have Both Been Established
Fourth, there was previously a split in the various appellate departments regarding when “liability” is established for the purposes of interest accrual. The law now says that “liability” is not established until there is a finding of both negligence and serious injury, which means that – in theory at least, the Court will again decide the meaning of this change – interest should not accrue against a defendant until both liability and a serious injury have been established.
Defendants May Have To Wait Longer To Move For Summary Judgment On “Serious Injury” Grounds
Fifth, the amendment potentially alters the timing of summary judgment motions. The amendment states that: “No liability for non-economic loss shall be fixed unless and until the trier of fact has determined the existence of a serious injury.” In any action to recover non-economic loss pursuant to this article, the trier of fact shall not determine the question of whether an injury is a serious injury until the trier of fact has determined the party or parties at fault.” Does this mean that a defendant cannot move for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the complaint on “serious injury” grounds until after liability has been decided, or can they move sooner? Of course, there will be arguments going in both directions from the opposite sides of the caption.
Timothy Freeman, Partner at GVK and Board Member of the New Jersey Defense Association, was recently featured in the New Jersey Law Journal article, “NJ Justices Hear Split Opinions Over Proposed Amendments to Expert Testimony Rules,” published on May 19th.
Following his appearance before the New Jersey Supreme Court on Monday, Timothy shared his insight on a proposed amendment to New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702, which seeks to clarify the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. The proposal carries significant implications for a range of industries, particularly pharmaceutical, manufacturing, and insurance, and the Court is expected to decide soon whether to adopt or reject the amendment.
Read the article here.
In a significant blow to the trucking and freight brokerage industry, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC held that negligent hiring claims against freight brokers are not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”). The Court unanimously concluded that the FAAAA’s “safety exception” preserves a state’s authority to regulate motor vehicle safety, including through common-law negligence claims arising from trucking accidents.
In practical terms, freight brokers may now face increased exposure when selecting motor carriers, even though brokers do not own the equipment, employ the driver, maintain the vehicle, enforce hours-of-service rules, or directly control the carrier’s day-to-day safety practices. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) remains responsible for federal safety oversight of commercial carriers, but the Court’s ruling places additional practical pressure on brokers to vet motor carriers before tendering loads.
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, concurred while recognizing the difficult position brokers may face, noting that federal law does not require brokers to take substantial steps to ensure they select safe trucking companies and that carriers are generally in the best position to monitor their own trucks and drivers. Still, the Court held that state-law negligent hiring claims fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception and may proceed.
Although Justice Kavanaugh cautioned that the decision should not be read to mean brokers will routinely face liability after trucking accidents, the ruling will almost certainly invite more claims against brokers and increase litigation, insurance, and compliance costs across the freight industry.
Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact Heather Ragone hragone@gvlaw.com or Bryan Schwartz bschwartz@gvlaw.com to discuss further.
Christopher L. Parisi, a Partner in our New York Labor Law construction practice, successfully secured the dismissal of a premises liability case in Queens County, New York. The action was discontinued and dismissed in its entirety as against our clients, with no settlement paid and no liability attributed to our clients.
The defense of this matter was transferred to our office more than a year after the Insureds’ Answer had been served. The plaintiff alleged that he sustained injuries after tripping and falling due to an alleged defective sidewalk in front of the Insureds’ premises. Plaintiff’s counsel disclosed a photograph of the sidewalk. The background of the photograph appeared to show a different building than the Insured’s property. Upon further investigation, we confirmed that the alleged sidewalk area was not on or adjacent to the Insured’s property, and was not otherwise owned, managed, maintained or controlled by the Insureds.
Based on this evidence, we notified plaintiff’s counsel and requested a voluntary dismissal of the action. After further delays in response to our request, we moved for summary judgment and dismissal, relying on our Insured clients’ Affirmation that the photograph did not depict their property.
Prior to opposing the Motion, plaintiff executed and returned a stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice.
This result reflects a complete defense victory for our clients, with the matter dismissed in full with prejudice, no settlement paid, and no liability attributed to our clients. Notably, this dismissal was achieved before depositions and IMEs took place.
Congratulations to Christopher L. Parisi on this successful outcome.
James Mercante, head of our Maritime Group, was a guest May 5th on Newsmax to offer insight into marine insurance implications in the Strait of Hormuz, the various forms of marine insurance coverage available to protect ships and cargo and the tremendous cost of war risk insurance that impacts shipping in areas of conflict.
Marisa Polito, an Associate on our General Liability Team, successfully secured the dismissal of Jasmine Thomas v. Mun Fulton Management LLC (Supreme Court, Kings County). The action was dismissed in its entirety, with no liability attributed to our client.
The plaintiff alleged that she sustained injuries after tripping and falling due to a purportedly defective sidewalk at our insured’s premises. However, during her deposition, the plaintiff offered testimony that directly contradicted the allegations set forth in her complaint. When asked to identify where the incident occurred, she instead described an entirely different incident, claiming she fell in a subway station due to a cracked step.
Based on this testimony, we promptly halted the deposition and requested that the plaintiff voluntarily discontinue the action. After receiving no response for several months, we moved for summary judgment, relying on the plaintiff’s own testimony, which undermined the foundation of her claims and failed to establish any connection to our client’s property.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff executed and returned a stipulation of discontinuance.
This result reflects a complete defense victory, with the matter dismissed in full and no liability attributed to our client.
Congratulations to Marisa Polito on this successful outcome.
James Mercante, head of our Maritime practice, appeared on WBAL-TV 11 Baltimore, offering insight into a new key settlement following the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge, as the insurer reaches an agreement with the owner of the Dali container ship.
Has Marine Insurance Become a War Risk?
Shipping is again on the world stage. From pileups of ships in port due to longshoremen strikes, to collapsing bridges and fatalities resulting from marine collisions. But with the unexpected and more global issue being the conflict of war, the maritime industry is on everyone’s radar. What is known to the general public only scratches the surface of the enormous uncertainties and legal issues that involve shipowners, charterers, professional mariners and cargo interests. But one thing is for certain… somewhere in every one of these disputes stands (or topples) marine insurance.
Marine insurance is nearly as imperative as fuel to keep ships moving with the confidence and comfort that if something goes wrong, insurance protection offers some solace. However, as seen in recent weeks, marine insurance protection for vessel owners is not so ‘strait’ forward. Vessel interests are at risk of major uninsured losses and exposures by continuing to operate (or not) in the Persian Gulf. The now infamous Strait of Hormuz is at its narrowest only 21 miles, yet 20% of the world’s oil and gas pass through it enroute to global markets. It is a chokepoint that has become a chokehold.
Shipowners and charterers are naturally concerned about attacks that can destroy the ship, cargo and endanger the crew. Commercial ship traffic is for the most part at a standstill with concerns of being struck by a missile or hitting an explosive mine. Marine insurers are either giving notice of cancellation of war risk protection or charging hefty additional premiums to keep the coverage intact. Some premium charges can be as much as 10% or more of a ship’s value for hull insurance. Thus, for a ship valued at $50 million, coverage for a voyage extending beyond the basic war risk transit period, can cost $5.0 million or more for.
There has been talk of the US Navy being deployed to escort ships through the Strait. But combatants are susceptible to mines and missiles as well. In addition, in response to insurance cancellations by private insurers, the Administration has called upon the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to launch a maritime reinsurance plan to provide war risk coverage for ships. This plan, according to a DFC press release, would “restore confidence in maritime trade, help stabilize international commerce, and support American and allied businesses operating in the Middle East during the conflict with Iran”. See DFC Media Release March 6, 2026. A government reinsurance plan is imperative during this conflict, since private reinsurance agreements contain a specific war and terrorism exclusion.
This would not be the first time the government sails into the marine insurance market. In 1914, Congress passed the War Risk Insurance Act, which established the Bureau of War Risk Insurance within the Treasury Department. See The History of Insurance Coverage in War, Smyrl Insurance (2024). This was during World War I. The Act provided coverage for American ships and cargo “against loss or damage by the risks of war”. This allowed the U.S. to continue participating in global commerce throughout the war.
Whether marine insurance for hull losses, cargo, delay, seizure, business interruption, and Protection & Indemnity (P&I) coverage is effective in the first place during war, or remains in effect, is a primary concern. A question also arises as to who is responsible for maintaining the war risk coverage… the vessel owner or the charterer, or both?
The EBB and Flow of War Risk Insurance
The Free of Capture and Seizure (FC&S) Warranty in an ocean marine policy excludes war risks coverage from hull insurance. Thus, losses incurred from mines, torpedoes, war and confiscation are not covered. Vessel owners are therefore expected to purchase separate war risk insurance for hull and machinery.
Marine hull war risk insurance normally covers only physical loss or damage to a vessel. Such policies often exclude losses that arise merely out of a ship or cargo’s delay, if no physical damage occurred. Therefore, when a vessel is seized, a valid claim under the policy does not necessarily arise without physical damage. However, under War Risk ‘Blocking and Trapping’ coverage, if the owner does not have access to a ship that’s stuck or detained for six months or more, a claim for Constructive Total Loss (CTL) may be payable by the marine insurer. This became a major issue in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.
Vessel owners can also purchase war risk insurance against P&I risks. P&I insurers offer Protection and Indemnity coverage for third-party claims against vessel owners that are proximately caused by risks associated with war such as when a member of the crew is injured or cargo is lost or damaged.
Although P&I Clubs have separate additional war risks policies available its members, many are canceling coverage for ships operating in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters. See Emily Chow and Jeslyn Lerh, Marine Insurers Cancel War Risk Cover as Iran Conflict Escalates, Insurance Journal (March 2026).
The Society of Maritime Arbitrators (SMA), founded in 1963, is an internationally recognized association of experienced maritime professionals who regularly arbitrate and mediate maritime disputes, including charter party disputes such as war risk.
Vessel owners can minimize exposure to risks by including clauses in charter party (lease) contracts, bills of lading, and crew contracts that disclaim liability for war risks. For example, charter parties will typically include a clause requiring the vessel owner to purchase war risk insurance, but the charterer is responsible for any additional war risk premium resulting from a charterer’s order to trade in an area where there is war:
Additional War Expenses
Basic war risk insurance is to be for owner’s account. Any extra expenses for additional war risk premium on hull and machinery which is reasonably incurred by the owners as the consequence of Charterers’ orders to trade in areas where there is war (de facto or de Jure) where the areas in question have been declared an additional risk premium area by the Vessel’s War Risk Insurers, shall be borne by the Charterers provided that before such expenses are incurred Charterers are given the opportunity to signify their approval…
See Midas Shipping Company Inc. and Claimant Pdvsa Petroleo, SMA No. 4153 (2011) (Before: John F. Ring, Jr., Thomas F. Fox and Donald B. Frost, Chairman).
In the SMA arbitration between Imbar Maritima S.a. and Palm Shipping, Inc., SMA No. 2790 (1991), the dispute involved an owner who refused to permit the ship to enter a war zone (Persian Gulf). The charter contract had no trading exclusion for the vessel, except that owner consent was required (not to be “unreasonably withheld”) for the vessel to enter a war zone. “Unreasonably” meant whether or not insurance “against all risks… is then available commercially”. Additionally, the charter party provided that if the vessel owner consents, charterer was responsible for paying the additional war risk insurance.
The SMA panel ruled that owners were in breach of charter, noting that it was widely known that war risks insurance was commercially available and owners were given one month’s notice of the intended voyage which was sufficient to have manned the vessel with a ‘willing crew’.
Moreover, if the charterer provides instructions to the ship owner to pick up cargo in a location that ends up in war conflict, the owner’s War Risk insurer will typically pay a covered claim and then subrogate against the charterers and its War Risk policy to recover the payment.
In view of the multiple issues surrounding such conflicts and marine insurance, it is clear that what happens at sea does not always stay at sea. Marine insurance plays a major role in whether or not ships take the ‘risk’ of a voyage and if so, for how much and who will pay for it. In such circumstances, a ‘willing crew’ as referred to in the Imbar Maritima arbitration, may be hard to find. But, like the ships themselves, the crew may have no choice but to wait it out with no safe exit. Thus, in times of conflict, it is the merchant vessels and crew that get caught in between. This demonstrates that it is not just a shot across the bow that will stop a ship; cancellation of insurance can have the same impact. Then the real battles begin!
JAMES E. MERCANTE is a partner at Gallo Vitucci Klar. He is president of the Board of Commissioners of Pilots of the State of New York and US Navy Captain. JOANNA M. GRILLO, maritime associate at Gallo Vitucci Klar, assisted in the preparation of this article.
Congratulations to Christopher Kendric and Kelli McGrath on securing a unanimous, sixteen-minute defense verdict in a tractor-trailer accident case. Justice Claudia Lanzetta in Queens County Supreme Court presided over this liability-only trial.
Plaintiff testified that, while traveling in the center lane of the West Side Highway in Manhattan, our client’s tractor-trailer struck his BMW from behind, causing it to spin 180˚ clockwise and come to rest atop the pedestrian crosswalk on West 16th Street, to the right of the Highway and facing the opposite direction. Plaintiff maintained that his foot was on the gas before and at the moment of impact, only moving to the brake afterward. He claimed he was traveling straight with the flow of traffic and did not intend to change lanes or turn when struck.
He described the impact as “devastating,” “traumatizing,” and “something [he] wouldn’t wish on [his] worst enemy.” Scene photographs, however, showed only scuffing and relatively minor damage to the passenger-side rear corner of the vehicle in a distinct right-to-left orientation.
The defense theory was that plaintiff had been traveling in the left lane, overtook the tractor-trailer, and made an abrupt right turn across the front of the truck to turn onto West 16th Street. An accident reconstruction expert testified that the BMW could only have rotated as it did, and ended up off to the right side of the Highway, if it had already been at an angle at the moment of impact. The truck’s front bumper striking the rear passenger-side corner caused the vehicle to lose traction and spin to the right due to its forward momentum.
On cross-examination, plaintiff acknowledged that if he had been traveling straight at the moment of impact, his front wheels would have been pointed straight as well. If the BMW had been struck squarely from behind, as claimed, it would have been pushed forward in the center lane. His testimony that his foot remained on the gas until after impact further set up the argument that the tractor-trailer would have needed to be accelerating and traveling faster than the flow of traffic to reach and strike the BMW.
The jury began deliberations at 10:58 a.m. and returned a verdict at 11:14 a.m.—barely enough time to select a foreperson.
